Srm is a secure replacement for rm(1). Unlike the standard rm, it overwrites the data in the target files before unlinkg them. This prevents command-line recovery of the data by examining the raw block device. It may also help frustrate physical examination of the disk, although it's unlikely that completely protects against this type of recovery. Srm uses algorithms found in _Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory_ by Peter Gutmann and THC Secure Delete (the overwrite, truncate, rename, unlink sequence). All users, but especially Linux users, should be aware that srm will only work on file systems that overwrite blocks in place. In particular, it will _NOT_ work on resiserfs or the vast majority of journaled file systems. It should work on ext2, FAT-based file systems, and the BSD native file system. Ext3 users should be especially careful as it can be set to journal data as well, which is an obvious route to reconstructing information.